# AT Epistemic Modesty

1. EM collapses on itself—you wouldn’t use modesty to adjudicate whether to be modest on the framework. We would either use epistemic modesty or not, not some kind of combination of the two, as long as there is a risk of offense either way.
2. EM is internally contradictory—each moral theory in consideration has its own set of obligations, but that’s it—none of them say to act to maximize the expected value across all possible ethical theories, so there is a 100% chance that EM is false. It’s like having three doctors advising a different medicine to take, so you mix the pills even though all three doctors say that mixing medicines is bad.

## Frontlines

**AT Real-world decision making (Sepielli)**

1. Unlike the two impacts to two different frameworks in a debate round, the impacts here are commensurable—you’re just weighing risks under a single consideration, i.e. your own well-being.
2. Is-ought fallacy—your argument appeals to what *is* the case, but not what ought to be the case.

**AT EM excludes bad practices**

1. If these practices are bad, they can be solved with more specific theory. [This argument is just like using “skep bad” as an argument for comparative worlds; all you have shown is that we shouldn’t read skep, not that we shouldn’t truth-test.]
2. But these issues are avoidable, anyway

**AT Terminal defense isn’t real**

There’s no necessary connection between a non-modest position and terminal defense against your opponent’s contention. EM only follows from the “no terminal defense” view if you are already committed to the normative truth of EM, i.e. that there is value to complying with moral requirements apart from the truth of any moral system. Otherwise there is no scale on which to weigh the offense from one case against that from another case. Therefore there’s no risk of offense from a contention that doesn’t link to the framework that has been won. Offense is always relative to a framework.